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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,

l
it

Plaintiff-Appellee,
V •

Case N o . 920693 C A

1

it

ROBERT ALAN PHILLIPS
Defendant-Appellant.

Priority N o . 2

i

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-2a-3(2)(k)

(1992).
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS

Defendant Robert Alan Phillips pled guilty on June 16,
1980 to first degree murder, a capital felony, in violation of
Utah Code A n n . § 76-5-202 (1978) and aggravated robbery, a first
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code A n n . § 76-6-302

(1978).

He n o w appeals from a denial of his motion to withdraw the guilty
plea in the Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, the
Honorable Michael R. Murphy presiding.
ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

Did the trial
pled

guilty

understanding

to first
of

the

court properly

determine

degree murder voluntarily
charge,

including
1

the

that

defendant

and with a
element

that

clear
the

killing

was intentional?

An appellate court "will not disturb a

trial court's determination that a defendant has failed to show
good cause for withdrawal of a guilty plea unless it clearly
appears that the trial judge abused his discretion."

State v.

Truiillo-Martinez, 814 P.2d 596, 599 (Utah App. 1991); accord
State v. Mildenhall, 747 P.2d 422, 424 (Utah 1987).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
All provisions upon which the State relies are set out
in the body of the brief.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
In 1980, Defendant was charged with first degree murder , a capital offense, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 7 6-5-202
(1978) and aggravated robbery, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (1978) (R. 15, 23-24).
Defendant was bound over after a preliminary hearing
where seven witnesses testified (R. 20-21; State's Exhibit 14-S,
Transcript of Preliminary Hearing [hereinafter "Prelim."] i-ii).
Defendant pled guilty to murder in the first degree and
aggravated robbery (Defendant's Exhibit 1-D, Transcript of Plea
Hearing and Penalty Phase [hereinafter "Plea Tr."] 1-24).

He was

sentenced to an indeterminate term of life imprisonment on the
murder conviction and a term of not less than five years for the
aggravated robbery conviction (R. 222) (Addendum A ) .
was taken.

2

No appeal

In

1992, defendant

guilty plea (R. 227-34 ).*

filed a motion to withdraw his

The trial court filed a Memorandum

Decision and Order denying the motion on May 12, 1992 (R. 252-56)
(Addendum B ) .

Defendant's Notice of Appeal was timely filed on

June 5, 1992 (R. 257-58).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
At about 10:30 p.m. on New Year's Day, 1980, defendant
sat in a friend's apartment and filed a notch in the handle of
his .357 revolver (Prelim. 61, 123, 148). He had killed Everett
Hamby, Jr. about an hour and a half earlier (Prelim. 146, 148).
The facts surrounding the killing were fleshed out at the preliminary hearing, the plea hearing, and the sentencing hearing.
PRELIMINARY HEARING
Defendant's friend, Kendall Northern, gave the following account of the killing at the preliminary hearing:
On January 1, 1980, defendant and Northern hailed a cab
in Salt Lake City (Prelim. 116, 123).

They drove around for

about an hour and a half, discussing among other things the
personal and family life of the Mr. Hamby, the cab driver (Prelim. 137).
At one point defendant experienced or feigned sickness
(Prelim. 135). After the cab stopped, defendant got out, pulled
the cab driver's door open, pointed a revolver at him, and told

1

So far as the State can determine from the record, this
motion related only to the charge of first degree murder, not
aggravated robbery.
3

him to get out and lie down behind the cab, which he did (Prelim.
138).
ets.

Defendant removed some money from the cab driver's pockThe driver offered no resistance (Prelim. 139-40).

Defen-

dant then walked approximately five feet away, raised and braced
his revolver, and shot the driver (Prelim. 142). About 30 seconds later, defendant shot the driver two more times (Prelim.
143).
With the gun in one hand and the money in the other,
defendant got in the passenger side of the cab and counted the
money (Prelim. 143-44).

There was $26 (Prelim. 144).

Northern testified that defendant said that if Northern
said anything about the crime defendant would kill him, and if
defendant was "busted," i.e., jailed, "he had people that could
kill me" (Prelim. 144).
The two dropped the car off near Trolley Square and
wiped off the prints (Prelim. 145).

Back at Northern's apart-

ment, defendant notched his gun handle.

It was the second notch

(Prelim. 148).
The day after the shooting, defendant read a newspaper
account of the shooting.

In fact, "he cut it out and said he

ought to call the paper because it wasn't accurate"
166).

(Prelim.

Defendant "bragged about how he shot him once behind the

ear and he said the paper said he shot him in the back and he
said he ought to call the paper because he didn't shoot him in
the back, he shot him in the side" (Prelim. 166-67).
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In addition to Norther's testimony, Dr. Monique Ryserf
assistant Utah State medical examiner, testified that any of the
three shots, "by themselves, taken alone, could have been fatal"
(Prelim. 102, 112).
PLEA HEARING
The plea hearing was held on June 16, 1980 before the
Honorable Christine M. Durham.

Defendant was present and repre-

sented by two defense counsel, Glenn Iwasaki and Fred Metos (Plea
Tr. 1). The prosecutor read into the record a document setting
forth the terms of the plea bargain (Plea Tr. 2-3). This document, entitled Stipulation as to Understanding with Respect to
Plea, was later signed by both defense counsel, the trial prosecutor, and the Salt Lake County Attorney (R. 214-15).

The stipu-

lation provided that defendant would plead guilty as charged in
the information and that the prosecution would advise the court
that the case was one for which capital punishment might be
legally justified, but would not make "an impassioned plea for
the imposition of the death penalty" (Plea Tr. 3; R. 216).
At the plea hearing Mr. Iwasaki stated, "Mr. Metos and
I have spent considerable time with Mr. Phillips regarding the
ramifications of his entry of the plea and also the ramifications
of the possible penalty he is facing" (Plea Tr. 4). He indicated
that a plea affidavit had been prepared and discussed with defendant "in detail" (Plea Tr. 4-5).

5

The court questioned defendant at length.2

The fol-

lowing is excerpted from the plea colloquy:
THE COURT: All right. Can you explain
to the court in your own words why you have
decided to plead guilty to these charges?
THE DEFENDANT: Well, I feel that it is
being the best of justice [sic], actually.
THE COURT: How is it in the best interest of you is what I am concerned about.
THE DEFENDANT:
I am going to get some
assistance in furthering my education or
helping myself, to better myself, whereas I
can help others.
MR. IWASAKI: That is not the question,
Mr. Phillips. The question was in light of
everything that we have all discussed, and in
light of your involvement in this matter, why
are you changing your plea to guilty rather
than retaining a not guilty posture? Why are
you pleading guilty today?
THE DEFENDANT:

I am not sure.

MR. IWASAKI: Did we not discuss what the
State was going to do at the penalty phase is
to not ask for the death penalty, per se, by
at least putting in facts before the court as
to what they believed the facts to be?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
MR. IWASAKI:

Did we not discuss that?

THE DEFENDANT:

Yes, we did.

MR. IWASAKI: And is the Information that
— Is that one of the reasons why you are
changing the plea, because the county attorney's office has stated that they would not
demand that you be executed?

2

Pages 1-15 of the plea transcript contain the entire plea
colloquy. They are annexed hereto as Addendum "C."
6

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
MR. IWASAKI:
the court?
THE DEFENDANT:

But rather, submit it to
Yes.

That is true.

THE COURT: All right.
Mr. Phillips, did you

~

MR. METOS: May I also add, Your Honor,—
You are also aware, Robert, of the state
of the evidence and we have discussed the
chances of your being found guilty of a lesser offense and being found guilty of the
offense that is charged?
THE DEFENDANT:
through that.

Yah.

We

have

gone

THE COURT: All right. After having gone
through that with your counsel, Mr. Phillips,
do you have an opinion about the evidence
against you? Do you think that you are likely to be convicted of the greater offense?
THE DEFENDANT:
I do.

Yes, ma'am.

Yes, ma'am,

THE COURT: All right. And we will be
spending considerable time, I think, reviewing that evidence, although, as I understand
it, the defendant's plea is entered.
And Mr. Phillips, I need you to indicate
to me if you are entering your plea of guilty
because you are in fact guilty of the offenses that are charged in the Information.
THE DEFENDANT:

Yes, ma'am, I am.

THE COURT: All right. Specifically, the
Information alleges that on or about January
1st, 1980, here in Salt Lake County, you
caused the death of Everett Hamby, Jr. while
you were engaged in the commission of an
aggravated robbery?

7

THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:
correct?

Yes, ma'am.

Are those facts true and

THE DEFENDANT:

Yes, ma'am.

THE COURT: All right. And did you cause
his death knowingly and intentionally at that
time?
THE DEFENDANT:
Not intentionally.
It
was accidental. But I was still at fault.
THE COURT: All right.
With respect to the intentional part, I
will need a proffer from counsel respecting
the facts that exist to establish intent.
THE IWASAKI: Your Honor, the facts would
indicate that Mr. Hamby was shot once in the
back of the head, a bullet going from right
to left in an area about a centimeter above
the top of his ear, exiting approximately —
atop of his right ear, exiting approximately
the middle of the temporal bone on his left
ear.
Further, the evidence will show, and Mr.
Phillips has subsequently confessed to the —
that a second and third shot were placed into
the body by Mr. Phillips.
Based upon Mr. Phillips' inability to
explain the reasons why the second and third
shot were fired, it is our opinion, Mr. Metos
and myself, that, with a hurdle to pass, the
facts would indicate an intentional nature,
although in Mr. Phillips' own mind there is
some question as to whether or not the first
shot was intentional. However, the other two
shots, the unexplainability of those other
two shots, would indicate from circumstantial
evidence his [sic] intentional nature of
them.
THE COURT: All right.
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Mr. Phillips, do you disagree in any way
with what Mr. Iwasaki has said about what the
evidence would show?
THE DEFENDANT:

No.

No, ma'am.

THE COURT: All right.
In Count II of the Information you are
charged on the same day with having unlawfully and intentionally taken personal property
from the possession or the control of Everett
Hamby, Jr. against his will by the use of
force or fear. Do you admit to those facts
as well?
THE DEFENDANT:

Yes, ma'am, I do.

THE COURT: All right. And do you admit
to the intent with respect to those facts?
Do you acknowledge that you intended to take
the property from his possession with the use
of force or fear or a firearm?
THE DEFENDANT:

Yes, ma'am.

THE COURT: All right. I would like you
now to sign that affidavit that is before you
on the podium that Mr. Iwasaki has prepared
and that we have discussed here, and I want
you to sign it as an indication, number one,
that you have read it; number two, that you
understand its contents; number three, that
everything that is in its contents is true
and accurate and correct as far as you know;
and number four, and most important, that
your decision to enter this plea of guilty is
freely and voluntarily made, that nobody's
threatened you or promised you anything except what we have talked about, the State not
arguing strenuously, and that you desire to
plead guilty yourself.
THE DEFENDANT:

Yes, ma'am.

THE COURT: Are all of those things true?
THE DEFENDANT:

Yes, ma'am, they are.
9

THE COURT: All right. Would you sign
the affidavit now in open court, please.
MR. IWASAKI:

Sign your full name.

(Defendant complies.)
MR. IWASAKI: As previously stated, Your
Honor, Mr. Metos and myself and [the prosecutor] have signed this already.
THE COURT: All right.

May I see it?

(Affidavit submitted to the court.)
THE COURT: Although I don't ordinarily
require the formality of having the witness
sworn in connection with the affidavit, I
think in this case I would prefer to do that.
MR. IWASAKI:

I would agree, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Would you raise your right
hand, please, Mr. Phillips. And what I want
you to do i[s] take an oath on the record
with respect to the truthfulness of your
statements as contained in this affidavit.
THE CLERK:
Do you solemnly
testimony you are about to give in
now before the court will be the
whole truth, and nothing but the
help you, God?
THE DEFENDANT:

swear the
the matter
truth, the
truth, so

I do.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you.
Mr. Phillips, you are now formally and
officially under oath, and I would like you
to reaffirm your answer to the questions
which I have just asked you; namely, does
your signature on this affidavit represent
the fact that, number one, you have read it?
THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:
stand it?

Yes, ma'am.

Number two, that you under-

THE DEFENDANT:

Yes, ma'am.
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THE COURT: Number three, that its contents are true and correct?
THE DEFENDANT:

Yes, ma'am.

THE COURT: And number four, that your
decision to plead guilty is made of your own
free will and choice?
THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:
much.

Yes, ma'am.

All right.

Thank you very

Having heard the defendant's affirmation
of his now sworn statements in the affidavit,
and having reviewed the affidavit, based upon
its contents and his re[s]ponses to my questions here in open court, I find that his
plea of guilty to two charges, one of criminal homicide, murder in the first degree, and
one of aggravated robbery, a first degree
felony, is freely and voluntarily made. I
will order that it be accepted and entered in
the record of the court.
(Plea Tr. 5-10, 13-15).
The affidavit signed and ratified under oath by defendant (Addendum "D") states in paragraph 12:
I have read this affidavit, or I have had it
read to me by my attorneys, and I know and
understand its contents. I am 26 years of
age, have attended school through the 12th
grade and I can read and
understand the
[E]nglish language.
I have discussed its
contents with my attorneys and ask the court
to accept my plea of guilty to the charges
set forth above in this affidavit because I
did, in fact, on the 1st day of January,
1980, in Salt Lake County, State of Utah,
intentionally or knowingly cause the death of
Everett Hamby, Jr. while I was engaged in the
commission of, or an attempt to commit, or
flight after committing or attempting to
commit Aggravated Robbery; and that on or
about the 1st day of January, 1980, in Salt
Lake County, State of Utah, unlawfully and
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intentionally take personal property in the
possession of Everett Hamby, Jr. at or near
2700 West 900 South, from the person or immediate presence of Everett Hamby, Jr., against
his will, by the use of force of [sic] fear,
and in the commission of same did use a firearm.
(R. 213-14)
SENTENCING HEARING
At the sentencing hearing, the Court received proffers
of evidence from the State and the defense (Plea Tr. 151).
The State proffered expert ballistics testimony to the
effect that the first shot was fired from 24 to 30 inches away
from the victim; that any one of the three bullets would have
killed the victim; that the bleeding from the second and third
gunshot wounds was consistent with cardiac activity continuing
for a brief period after the first shot; and that the chances of
surviving the first shot were "probably nil" (Plea Tr. 166-67).
The prosecutor indicated that the State was initially
concerned that the shooting might indeed have been accidental
(Plea Tr. 171). For this reason the State requested Northern to
submit to a polygraph test.

The test suggested that Northern had

lied about certain facts, but was inconclusive because of a heart
condition from which he suffered (Plea Tr. 171-72).

The prosecu-

tor stated that the prosecution team was "very concerned," since
M

[o]f course, we didn't want to ask [for] the death penalty if

there was any possible chance that Mr. Phillips had accidentally
discharged that weapon into Mr. Hamby" (Plea Tr. 173).
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Confronted with that polygraph result, Northern confessed his involvement (Plea Tr. 174). He also confessed that he
and defendant "discussed in some detail the possibilities of a
robbery" and that defendant had indicated "that if a robbery went
down they would in all probability have to shoot the witness,
because Mr. Phillips didn't want any witness around to testify
against him later on" (Plea Tr. 175-76).
The prosecutor reported that the polygraph "indicates
that Mr. Northern did not see that first shot fired" (Plea Tr.
180).

However, the first shot went into "the most vital portion

of the person's body . . . traversing from right to left across
the most vital areas of his brain and killing him."

The prosecu-

tor added, "The odds and probabilities of that on an accidental
discharge in a fashion of which Mr. Phillips was robbing Mr.
Hamby leads me to believe that the first shot was aimed

..."

And of course, there was "no question that the second and third
shots were intentionally fired" (Plea Tr. 181). Ballistics tests
also indicated "a well aimed [first] shot" (Plea Tr. 191; see
also Plea Tr. 192-195).
The prosecutor represented that defendant had brought
with him a "black toilet paper roll" described by defendant as a
silencer (Plea Tr. 183).

However, the State stipulated that it

was not used in the killing (Plea Tr. 271).
Defense counsel responded to this proffer.

Mr. Iwasaki

admitted that defendant "did fire those shots, and under circum-
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stances which would lead one to believe that it was intentional
and knowing"

(Plea Tr. 199).

He also attempted to discredit

Northern's testimony (Plea Tr. 199-200).

While not challenging

the prosecutor's proffer, he cautioned the court that it was an
oral proffer and urged the court "to look at all of the facts and
circumstances,

including

(Plea Tr. 203).

the

preliminary

hearing

tremscript"

In addition, he argued that the facts of the

case were "subject to different inferences and interpretations"
(Plea Tr. 205).
The defense also called five prominent defense attorneys, a deputy county attorney, a psychologist who had evaluated
Mr. Northern, and numerous family members.

Except for the psy-

chologist, who testified that Northern was a manipulative antisocial personality

(Plea Tr. 212), these witnesses' testimony

related to the death penalty and defendant's personal life.
At the conclusion the proffers and testimony, the court
entered on the record its findings regarding aggravation and
mitigation (Plea Tr. 302-09).

With respect to the intentional

nature of the killing, the court found as follows:
Third, there is substantial evidence in
this case to show that the shooting was intentional , and not accidental as claimed by
the defendant. Most of those factors which
show the intentional nature of the act rather
than its accidental occurrence I have already
described fsee Plea Tr. 301-03].
They have to do with the planning and
discussion by the parties of the crime,
existence and presence of the silencer on
person of the defendant on the evening of

14

the
the
the
the

crime, the failure of the parties to hide
their identification for the substantial
period of time they were with the victim;
The fact that the defendant was out of a
job and needed money, the fact that there
were three shots fired, all of them in deadly
locations on the victim's body, the fact
which is undisputed, that the gun was loaded
and the defendant's finger was on the trigger, that the victim was unarmed and cooperative;
The fact that the pressure needed to cause
that gun to fire in its double action phase
was at least 12 pounds, as my recollection of
the evidence shows, the wipe-up of the fingerprints in the cab, fingerprinting and
reloading of the gun, and the purchase of the
shoulder holster the following day, the day
following the crime, for purposes of carrying
it more conveniently, the notch on the handle, and the newspaper article which I have
already described.
(Plea Tr. 303-04, emphasis added).
The court sentenced defendant to a term of life imprisonment for the capital homicide and five years to life for the
aggravated robbery (R. 222). The judge penned the following comment to the Board of Pardons on the Judgment and Commitment form:
This defendant deliberately and unnecessarily
murdered an innocent victim for $26.00, and
attempted to convince the court that the act
was accidental. I hope that he will not be
released on parole after the statutory fifteen years, but that he will in fact serve a
sentence which more closely resembles "life
imprisonment."
(R. 223, emphasis added) (see Addendum "A").
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MOTION TO WITHDRAW GUILTY PLEA
The record on appeal does not include a transcription
of the hearing on defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty
plea.3

The motion was apparently based primarily if not wholly

on the transcript of the plea hearing, which was admitted into
evidence (R. 250)/

Therefore, no facts were adduced at this

hearing in addition to those summarized above.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
1.

Defendant contends that the trial court erred in

refusing to set aside his guilty plea to first degree murder.
This contention rests upon two stated grounds: (1) that defendant
was not informed of potential defenses; and (2) that there was
insufficient evidence of defendant's guilt.
Defendant offers no facts, argument, or analysis in
support of his first contention.

This Court should therefore

disregard it.

3

It is well settled in this jurisdiction that H[i]£ an
appellant fails to provide an adequate record on appeal, [a
reviewing court] must assume the regularity of the proceedings
below." Jolivet v. Cook. 784 P.2d 1148, 1150 (Utah 1989) (quoting State v. Miller, 718 P.2d 403, 405 (Utah 1986)), cert, denied
493 U.S. 1033, 110 S. Ct. 751 (1990).
* The record does not reflect that the transcript of the
preliminary hearing was admitted into evidence, although it is
included in the record on appeal. The State requests this Court
to take judicial notice of its contents pursuant to Willett v.
Barnes, No. 900344, slip op. at 4 (Utah Oct. 28, 1992) (Court
took judicial notice of preliminary hearing transcript not included in the record on appeal).
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In pressing his second contention, defendant ignores
the overwhelming evidence of guilt presented or proffered in the
preliminary hearing and the district court.

Because he fails to

marshal this evidence, his sufficiency argument fails.
Defendant's attempts to distinguish North Carolina v.
Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 91 S. Ct. 160 (1970) are unavailing.

Like

Alford, defendant pled guilty in the face of strong evidence of
guilt.

However, while Alford asserted his innocence under oath,

defendant admitted his guilt under oath.
Finally, defendant's reliance upon State v. Breckenridcre, 688 P.2d 440 (1983) is misplaced.

Unlike that case, here

the State produced overwhelming evidence of defendant's guilt.
Furthermore, the issue of intent was exhaustively explored at the
plea and sentencing hearings.

Defendant admitted his guilt under

oath and the court made findings to support its conclusion that
the killing was intentional.
Judge Durham was careful to ensure that defendant's
guilty plea was knowing, voluntary, and supported by substantial
evidence of guilt.

The trial court carefully reviewed this

evidence and rendered its decision in a thoughtful and thorough
memorandum decision.

There was no abuse of discretion here.
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ARGUMENT
BECAUSE IN 1980 DEFENDANT PLED GUILTY VOLUNTARILY AND WITH A CLEAR UNDERSTANDING OF THE
CHARGE, THE TRIAL COURT IN 1992 PROPERLY
DENIED HIS MOTION TO WITHDRAW THE GUILTY PLEA
"A plea of guilty • . . may be withdrawn only upon good
cause shown and with leave of the court."
13-6(2)(a) (1990).

Utah Code Ann. § 77-

A "withdrawal of a plea of guilty is a privi-

lege/ not a right . . . [and] is within the sound discretion of
the trial court."

State v. Gallecros, 738 P.2d 1040, 1041 (Utah

1987).
Defendant has not clearly articulated the legal basis
for his claim on appeal.

He does not cite the federal or state

constitutions, and he admits that rule 11, Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure, does not control.5

The State will therefore treat

his appeal as premised solely upon section 77-13-6(2)(a)'s "good
cause" requirement.
Good cause exists where a plea was entered involuntarily or without a clear understanding of the charge.

State v.

Thorup, No. 920404-CA, slip op. at 3 (Utah App. Nov. 13, 1992).
Defendant argues good cause based upon two contentions: (1) that

5

Defendant's original motion relied upon rule 11 of the
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure and cases construing it (R. 23233). However, defendant now concedes that since he pled guilty
on June 16, 1980, and the rule did not become effective until
July 1, 1980, rule 11 does not control (Br. of App. 9; see also
R. 242-43 [State's memorandum]; R. 253-54 [Memorandum Decision]).
See Hallidav v. United States. 394 U.S. 831, 833, 89 S. Ct. 1498,
1499 (1969) (federal rule 11 is inapplicable to pleas entered
before its effective date).
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defendant was not informed of potential defenses; and (2) that
there was insufficient evidence of defendant's guilt.
A.

Defendant Waived Any Issue Involving
Potential Defenses.

Defendant claims that the trial court erred by not
permitting defendant to withdraw his guilty plea on the ground
that "defendant was not fully informed of his defenses" (Br. of
App. 6).

However, defendant has never fully articulated this

argument.

He has never identified the defenses of which he

should have been informed, nor has he cited any authority requiring the court to inform him of them.
Where a brief "wholly lacks legal analysis and authority to support [an] argument," a reviewing court "must disregard
this issue."

State v. Wareham, 772 P.2d 960, 966 (Utah 1989).

See also State v. Amicone, 689 P.2d 1341, 1344 (Utah 1984); State
v. Reiners, 803 P.2d 1300, 1301 n.2 (Utah App. 1990).

This Court

must accordingly disregard defendant's first point on appeal.
B.

The State Proffered Overwhelming Evidence
of Defendant's Guilt. But Defendant Fails
to Marshal It.

In its memorandum decision denying the motion to withdraw, the court relied upon Strong v. Turner. 22 Utah 2d 294, 452
P.2d 323 (Utah 1969) as the authority controlling at the time of
defendant's guilty plea

(R. 253-54).

Strong required that a

guilty plea be made "voluntarily" and "with a clear understanding
of what the charge is . . . "
P.2d at 324 & 324 n.2.

22 Utah 2d at 296 & 296 n.2, 452

Based on the facts set forth above, the
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court concluded that "the court [accepting the plea] was able to
determine defendant was admitting an intentional act notwithstanding his earlier claim of accident" (R. 254).
Defendant asserts that "the proffer of evidence produced regarding the facts that existed does not establish intent"
(Br. of App. 9). Consequently, he argues, "there would have been
no reason for Defendant to plead guilty to murder when it was not
committed, unless he believed through misapprehension of nature
and element of crime [sic], that he had committed it intentionally" (Br. of App. 11).
This argument is in effect a sufficiency challenge to
the trial court's ruling.

In order to mount such a challenge, an

appellant must marshal all the evidence in support of the trial
court's verdict and then demonstrate that "the evidence, including all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, is insufficient to
support the findings against an attack."

State v. Moosman, 794

P.2d 474, 475-76 (Utah 1990); accord State v. Chavez, No. 910723CA, slip op. at 5 (Utah App. Oct. 22, 1992).
In 1980, the State presented and proffered overwhelming
evidence of defendant's guilt and of his understanding of the
intent issue.

The trial court was aware of the intent issue when

it accepted defendant's plea and held his sentencing hearing.

It

ensured that defendant understood that he was pleading guilty to
an intentional killing and that the evidence against him was
strong (see pp. 5-12 herein).

The court reviewed the transcript
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of the preliminary hearing and heard detailed proffers of the
evidence against defendant, including evidence of his intent to
kill (see pp. 12-14 herein).

Finally, Judge Durham entered in

the record extensive findings of fact on this very issue, concluding that the killing was intentional (see pp. 14-16 herein).
In 1992, the trial court found that "defendant's voluntary and knowing plea of guilty was verified on the record in an
exchange between the defendant and the court" (R. 254) (Addendum
"B").

It further found that the plea affidavit "was a crucial

and inextricable part of the colloquy," and that "[b]y inquiring
of the defendant two separate times about the affidavit, the
court was able to determine defendant was admitting an intentional act notwithstanding his earlier claim of accident" (id.).
Finally,

the trial

court

found

that

"[ejven after defendant

indicated the death was accidental and not intentional, he repeated his concurrence with his counsel's view that evidence of
intent existed" (R. 255).
Because defendant fails to marshal or even acknowledge
these findings and the extensive evidence supporting them, he
falls short of demonstrating the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea.
C.

Defendant's Guilty Plea Was Proper Under
North Carolina v. Alford.

As a "wholly independent basis" for its ruling, the
trial court relied upon North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 91
S. Ct. 160 (1970).

Alford testified at his plea hearing "that he
21

had not committed the murder but that he was pleading guilty
because he faced the threat of the death penalty if he did not do
so."

400 U.S. at 28, 91 S. Ct. at 162-63.

The United States

Supreme Court held that "an express admission of guilt . . . is
not a constitutional requisite to the imposition of criminal
penalty."

A guilty plea may be constitutionally entered where "a

defendant

intelligently

concludes

that

his

interests

require

entry of a guilty plea and the record before the judge contains
strong evidence of actual guilt."

400 U.S. at 37, 91 S. Ct. at

167; see also Hurst v. Cook, 777 P.2d 1029, 1038 (Utah 1989) ("an
accused can lawfully plead guilty to an offense for which he
could not have been convicted if the plea is in exchange for a
lesser sentence").

The court found that defendant, after consul-

tation with his counsel, acknowledged that he would likely be
found guilty of first degree murder (R. 255).
Defendant attempts to distinguish Alford on the ground
that "there is no strong evidence of guilt" in his case (Br. of
App. 7).
which

Again, this is essentially a sufficiency challenge in

defendant

fails to marshal the supporting

evidence as

required by Moosman and Chavez. His claim therefore fails,
It fails on the merits as well.

At the preliminary

hearing, at the plea hearing, and at the sentencing hearing, the
State presented and proffered overwhelming evidence of defendant's guilt (see pp. 3-15 herein).
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Unlike Alford, who asserted

his innocence under oath, defendant admitted his guilt under oath
(see pp. 10-12 herein).
In view of defendant's desire to plead guilty and the
strong evidence of guilt before the trial court, the trial court
did not abuse its discretion in concluding that Alford provides a
sufficient basis for defendant's guilty plea.
D.

State v. Breckenridge Does Not Assist
Defendant.

Finally, defendant's reliance upon State v. Breckenridge , 688 P.2d 440 (1983) on appeal is misplaced.

First, this

is a new argument, asserted for the first time on appeal (see R.
227-34), and should be rejected on that ground alone.

State v.

Anderson, 789 P.2d 27, 29 (Utah 1990).
Second, Breckenridge is inapposite.

Although Brecken-

ridge pled guilty to arson, the only facts presented to the trial
court indicated that Breckenridge accidentally started the fire.
The supreme court stated, "the record recites no factual basis
from which we might

conclude that

Breckenridge, 688 P.2d at 443.

an arson ever

occurred."

On the contrary, the facts sug-

gested that Breckenridge had no reason to plead guilty other than
a mistaken belief that he had committed the crime.

Id.

The

court held that Rule 11(e)(4), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure,
and article I, section 7 of the Utah Constitution required withdrawal of the plea.

Id. at 444.
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Defendant here has not asserted a constitutional violation and rule 11 does not apply.

But factual differences between

the two cases run deeper even than these legal ones.
The State here presented or proffered overwhelming evidence that defendant intentionally killed Everett Hamby.

Even

defense counsel admitted that defendant "did fire those shots,
and under circumstances which would lead one to believe that it
was intentional" (Plea Tr. 199). Defendant knowingly pled guilty
in order to reduce the risk of receiving the death penalty, as is
his right.

See Alford, 400 U.S. at 28, 91 S. Ct. at 162-63.

Most significantly, the court receiving Breckenridge's
guilty plea failed to make an explicit record finding that Breckenridge understood the nature and elements of arson. Id. at 443.
Here, defendant raised the intent issue in the plea hearing.

The

trial court exhaustively explored it with counsel and with defendant; inquired into why defendant was pleading guilty; questioned
whether he agreed that there was evidence of intent and that he
would probably be found guilty; had him personally affirm in open
court the contents of his plea affidavit, then repeat his answers
under oath; and entered findings supporting its conclusion that
the killing was intentional.
In sum, the record is replete with evidence of defendant's guilt and with evidence that he knowingly and voluntarily
entered his plea of guilty.

Two district judges have reached

these conclusions without difficulty.
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On this record, the defer-

ential review required by State v. Trulillo-Martinez, 814 P. 2d
596, 599 (Utah App. 1991) and State v. Mildenhall, 747 P.2d 422,
424 (Utah 1987) is amply merited.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the State respectfully requests
that this Court affirm the trial court's denial of defendant's
motion to withdraw his plea of guilty.
RESPECTFULLY submitted on November 25, 1992.
R. PAUL VAN DAM
Attorney General

)ROS< JR.
distant Attorney General
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ADDENDUM A
Judgment and Commitment (1980)
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TED CANNON
Salt Lake County Attorney
By: GREGORY L. BOWN
Deputy County Attorney
C-220 Metropolitan Hall of Justice
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Telephone: 535-6130
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH
Plaintiff
JUDGMENT AND COMMITMENT

vs
£>T

ROBERT PHILLIPS ^

Case No. CR-80-296
Defendant

On the 23rd day of June, 1980, appeared Michael J. Christensen, the
attorney for the State of Utah, and the defendant appeared in person and by
counsel, Glenn K. Iwasaki and Fred Metos.
IT IS ADJUDGED that the defendant has been convicted upon a plea of
guilty of the offense of Criminal Homicide, Murder in the First Degree, a capital
offense, as charged in Count I of the Information; and upon a plea of guilty of
the offense of Aggravated Robbery, a first degree felony, as charged in
Count II of the Information; and the Court having asked if the defendant has
anything to say why judgment should not be pronounced, and no sufficient cause
to the contrary being shown or appearing to the Court,
IT IS ADJUDGED that the defendant is guilty as charged and convicted.
IT IS ADJUDGED that the defendant be confined and imprisoned at the
Utah State Prison for the indeterminate term of life imprisonment, and is not
fined as provided by law for the crime of Criminal Homicde, a capital offense, as
charged in Count I of the Information; and that the defendant be confined and
imprisoned at the Utah State Prison for the indeterminate term of not less than
five years and which may be for life, and is not fined as provided by law for
the crime of Aggravated Robbery, a first degree felony, as charged in Count II

of the Information.

Commitment shall issue forthwith.

Such sentences to run

concurrently.
IT IS ORDERED that N. D. Hayward, Sheriff of Salt Lake County,
State of Utah, take the said defendant, Robert A. Phillips, and deliver said
defendant without delay to the Utah State Prison, Draper, Utah, where said
defendant shall then and there be confined and imprisoned in accordance with
this Judgment and Commitment.

DATED this /fT

n

day

J*

di3^\%^.
BY THE COURT

ATTEST
W. STERLING EVANS

,Cl£RK

CHRISTINE M. DURHAM, Judge

Pursuant to the provisions of Section 77-35-21, Utah Code Annotated,
1953 as amended, and in accordance with the guidelines developed conjointly
between the Courts and the Board of Pardons, I recommend that the defendant
serve^/7
A*y?A27£Z
^ClMontiW)prior
parole.
iZ*l ^z/l/x23
/$Z rfLMonti'&j
prior to release or parole
Imprisonment is ordered in deviation from the guidelines because

Comments, including mitigating or aggravating circumstances

T^de&ndartr

DATED this

^^^t^^^/

* / s / " day of.

H 1980

^^^^7UC€<
^7 &3<ro£>3

%m^-

fa pat4&arffr>i

THE COURT

CHRISTINE M. DURHAM, Judge

r ^

^€^t/C^Sf

-r„rf,rm*nt and Commitment this 26th day
Mailed a copy of the foregoing Judgment and co
rt „« K iwasaki and Fred Metos. Attorneys for Defendant,
of June. 1980, to Glenn K. IwasaKi ana
333 South 200 East. Salt Lake City, UT 84111.
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ADDENDUM B
Memorandum Decision and Order Denying Motion
to Withdraw Plea (1992)

HAY 1 2 1S32
By-£$2k

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT

y C;*.X

IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

MEMORANDUM DECISION
AND ORDER

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
vs.

CASE NO-

801902961

ROBERT ALAN PHILLIPS,
Defendant*

Defendant Robert Alan Phillips has moved to withdraw his
1980 plea of guilty to first degree murder, a capital offense,
and aggravated robbery.
the two charges.

Defendant's focus is on the first of

The State promised not to make an impassioned

argument for imposition of the death penalty in exchange for
defendant's plea of guilty to the first degree murder charge.
At a hearing on June 16, 1980, the plea arrangement was
presented to the district judge.

An inextricable part of the

proposed plea was defendant's affidavit which was apparently
prepared for him by counsel.

In the affidavit the defendant

stated he knew the State must prove each element beyond a
reasonable doubt (para. 3), admitted his guilt generally (para.

C002f2

STATE V. PHILLIPS

6),

and

PAGE TWO

specifically

admitted

MEMORANDUM DECISION

that

he

intentionally

and

knowingly caused the death of the victim (para. 12).
During the colloquy with the judge, defendant denied he
intentionally caused the death of the victim asserting that the
death

was

accidental.

Defendant's

counsel

immediately

indicated that there was evidence from which intent could be
inferred.

The Court then asked the defendant if he disagreed

with

counsel/s

his

comment

response was unequivocal:

on

"No".

the

evidence.

Defendant's

(Tr. pp. 9-10).

It was only

after this specific colloquy that the court made inquiry of the
defendant

concerning

the

affidavit.

The

defendant

orally

verified he had read the affidavit, understood its contents,
that the affidavit was true and accurate and that his plea
decision was voluntary.
the defendant

Only after this oral verification did

sign the affidavit.

The court then had the

defendant sworn and he again stated he had read the affidavit,
understood

its

contents,

that

the

affidavit

was

true

and

correct and that his decision to plead guilty was voluntary
(Tr. 14-15).
Rule 11, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, was enacted in
the 1980 legislative session and was not effective until July
1,

1980.

Laws

of Utah.

19890

Ch.

14, Section

1.

As a

000253
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MEMORANDUM DECISION

consequence, it is inapplicable to the plea in this case which
was

entered

June

16,

1980.

The

applicable

standard

was

articulated in Strong v. Turner, 22 Utah 2d 294, 452 P.2d 323,
324 (1969).

There the Court indicated that a plea must be made

voluntarily and with a clear understanding of the charge.

As

required by Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969), defendant's
voluntary and knowing plea of guilty was verified on the record
in an

exchange

between

the

defendant

and

the

court.

The

affidavit of defendant was a crucial and inextricable part of
the colloquy.

By inquiring of the defendant two separate times

about the affidavit, the court was able to determine defendant
was admitting an intentional act notwithstanding his earlier
claim of accident.
There is a wholly independent basis not presented by the
State to deny the motion to withdraw the plea.

Before the

court engaged the defendant in the above-referenced colloquy,
the

defendant

in

response

to

a

question

from

his

counsel

confirmed that he was pleading guilty because the State would
then agree not to demand the death penalty
court

then

asked

consultation with

the

defendant

counsel, that

convicted of the capital offense.

whether

(Tr. p. 8).

he believed,

The

after

it was likely he would be
Defendant's response was an

Cn0254
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PAGE FOUR

unequivocal "yes".

(Tr. 8).

Even after defendant indicated

the death was accidental and not intentional, he repeated his
concurrence with his counsel's view that evidence of intent
existed.

(Tr* pp. 9-10).

These

facts

are

remarkably

Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25
entered
guilt

a plea
in

order

similar

avoid

the

those

in

North

(1970) where the defendant

of guilty while not
to

to

death

factually
penalty.

acknowledging
Under

those

circumstances and where there was strong evidence of guilt, the
Court found the plea to be a voluntary and knowing one.

In the

instant case the defendant confirmed his counsel's view that he
would likely be found guilty of the capital offense.

As a

consequence, defendant's plea was appropriate.
For the foregoing reasons, defendant's motion to withdraw
his plea is denied.
Dated this /2

dav of May, 1992.

MICHAEL R. MURPHY
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

/
'
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MEMORANDUM DECISION

I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy
of the

foregoing Memorandum

following, this

Decision and Order,

to the

JJL ^citav of May, 1992:

Walter R. Ellett
Deputy County Attorney
Attorney for Plaintiff
231 East 400 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Paul Gotay
Attorney for Defendant
5085 S. State Street
Murray, Utah 84107
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ADDENDUM C
Plea Colloquy (1980)

1

SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH;

MONDAY, JUNE 1 6 ,

1980;

1 1 : 5 3 A.M.

-oOo-

2
3

THE COURT:

4
5

We will go on the record in the case of The

State of Utah vs. Robert Alan Phillips, Criminal No. CR80-296,
Is it Phillip or Phillips?

6
7

MR. IWASAKI:

8

THE COURT:

9

Metos.

11

Christensen.

15

The State of Utah is represented by Mr. Michael

Are there any other appearances?

12

14

Let the record show he is present in the

courtroom represented by counsel, Mr. Iwasaki and Mr. Fred

10

13

Phillips, Your Honor.

MR. CHRISTENSEN:

Leon Dever for the State also, Your

Honor.
THE COURT:

16

All right.

Thank you very mch.

This matter was scheduled to begin a trial today;

17

however, I understand from discussions of counsel that an

18

arrangement for the entry of a plea has been discussed and

19

negotiated between the parties and that the court's approval

20

for that arrangement will be sought here today.

21

correct?

22

MR. IWASAKI:

That is correct, Your Honor.

Is that

We intend

23

at this time to have Mr. Phillips move the court to allow us

24

to withdraw our previously entered pleas of not guilty to the

25

crimes of criminal homicide, murder first degree, and aggra-

1

vated robbery, murder —

aggravated robbery a first degree

2

felony, to enter pleas of guilty to the charges as contained

3

in the Information.

4

THE COURT: All right:

5

MR. IWASAKI:

Prior to that, I believe the State would

6

like to orally proffer to the court a stipulation which will

7

be reduced to writing, which we will return to the court at

8

1:30, as to arrangements concerned with the plea.

9
10

THE COURT:

All right.

MR. CHRISTENSEN:

Thank you.

I will. Your Honor.

We are in the

11

process right now of doing an informal document for the court.

12

But essentially, the plea, the stipulation, the understanding

13

with respect to the plea, would read as follows:
Comes now the State of Utah, by and through myself

14
15

and Ted Cannon, and hereby agrees that in exchange for the

16

defendants plea of guilty as charged in the Information the

17

State agrees to act as following in the penalty phase of the

18

above-entitled matter:
1.

19

The State will submit to the trial judge all

20

statements, reports, preliminary hearing transcripts, and all

21

other documentary evidence, including affidavits as the par-

22

ties deem appropriate, for full and fair consideration of the

23

appropriateness of the penalty of death in the above-entitled

24

matter.

25

2.

In addition to the above, the State will

1

present to the court all evidence it finds relevant concern-

2

ing both guilt and aggravation;

3

3. Will indicate to the court what the State

-4

finds to be the natural inferences and consequences of the

5

factual matters presented both orally or with respect to the

6

matters submitted in pursuance of Paragraph 1.

7

4.

We will advise the court that in the opinion

8

of the State the case is one for which capital punishment may

9

be legally justified, but the State will not make an

10

impassioned plea for the imposition of the death penalty,

11

rather that such a matter is appropriately left to the dis-

12

cretion of the court based upon the submitted evidence of

13

guilt of aggravation and mitigation,

14

5.

The State will answer all inquiries of the

15

court as candidly as possible and as consistent as possible

16

with the above paragraphs.

17
18
19

Dated and signed.
THE COURT:

Thank you very much.

Are we prepared, then, to discuss the entry or the

20

change of the defendants plea in the entry of his plea of

21

guilty here today?

22

MR. IWASAKI:

23

THE COURT: ^Thank you.

We are, Your Honor.

24

I think the defendant had better come forward.

25

Mr, Iwasaki and Mr. Metos, as the defendant's

1 || attorneys, I would like to ask you a few questions before I
2 || question the defendant respecting his entry of the plea.
3 11

MR. IWASAKI:

4

THE COURT:

Certainly.
Have you explained to the defendant fully

5

and completely, "to the best of your ability, the nature of the

6

charges that h a v e been lodged against him in this matter?

7

MR. IWASAKI:

I am satisfied, in my opinion, that Mr.

8

Metos and I have spent considerable time with Mr. Phillips

9

regarding the ramifications of his entry of the plea and also

10 the ramifications of the possible penalty he is facing.
n
12

In that regard. Your Honor, I have taken the
liberty to prepare an affidavit for the defendant which is

13 similar to those that we have used consistently in the court,
u

with minor changes.

One of the changes which I would like to

15

indicate to the court at this time, and of which Mr. Phillips

16

is aware, is regarding the paragraph on appeal rights, waiving

17 II the rights on appeal.
18 ||

Mr. Phillips does understand that he is waiving

19

his rights as to his guilt by entry of this plea.

However, as

20

the constitutional ramifications of the Utah death penalty

21

statute, I believe that is still an open question, and Mr.

22

Phillips, it is his understanding that he will preserve his

23

rights as to those constitutional issues on the death penalty,

24

but does in fact waive his right to an appeal as to the guilt

25

aspect of it.

With the minor changes, we have gone over this

1
2

affidavit of the defendant with Mr. Robert Alan Phillips in

3

detail.

4

Metos and Michael Christensen, the prosecuting attorney.

I have previously affixed my signature, as has Fred

I believe Mr. Phillips is fully aware of what is

5
6

contained in that affidavit and at this time knows what all is

7

occurring before Your Honor.

8

think, have been fully answered and discussed by both Mr.

9

Metos and myself.

And any questions that he has, I

Fred, do you have anything to add for the record?

10
11

MR. METOS:

No, I don't.

12

THE COURT:

All right.

13

Iwasaki.

14

ant a number of questions.

15
16
17
18
19
20

Thank you very much, Mr.

Based upon that, I would now like to ask the defend-

Mr. Phillips, I would like to know first how old
you are and how much education you have.
THE DEFENDANT:

I am 26, and I have got a GED.

through the tenth grade and was in the eleventh when I quit.
THE COURT:

All right.

And do you read and understand

the English language?

21

THE DEFENDANT:

22

THE COURT: Without any problems?

23

THE DEFENDANT:

24

THE COURT:

25

I went

Yes, ma'am.

Yes, ma'am.

All right.

Have you had an opportunity to

read through the affidavit that Mr. Iwasaki has prepared for

1

your use in these proceedings?

2

THE DEFENDANT:

3

THE COURT:

4

Yes, ma'am, I did.

Do you believe that you understand the

contents of that affidavit?

5

THE DEFENDANT:

6

THE COURT:

Yes, ma'am.

Do you understand that you have a number of

7

rights, if you take these charges to trial before a jury, that

8

are explained and discussed in that affidavit?

9
10

THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:

Yes, ma'am.

All right.

Specifically, I would like to

11

inquire, inasmuch as you have apparently decided to plead as

12

charged, whether you are aware that if you took these charges

13

to trial that you would have the right to have the State

14

required to prove to the jury's satisfaction each and every

15

one of the essential elements of the charges beyond a

16

reasonable doubt?

17

THE DEFENDANT:

18

THE COURT:

Yes, ma'am, I do.

All right.

And you understand, further,

19

that you would have rights to confront the witnesses against

20

you and to have your counsel cross examine them on your

21

behalf, and so forth?

22

THE DEFENDANT:

23

THE COURT:

Yes, ma'am.

All right.

Can you explain to the court in

24

your own words why you have decided to plead guilty to these

25

charges?

1
2
3

THE DEFENDANT:

Well, I feel that it is being the best

of justice, actually.
THE COURT: How is it in the best interest of you is

4

what I am concerned about.

5

THE DEFENDANT:

I am going to get some assistance in

6

furthering my education or helping myself, -to better myself,

7

whereas I can help others.

8
9

MR. IWASAKI:

That is not the question, Mr. Phillips.

The question was in light of everything that we have all

10

discussed, and in light of your involvement in this matter,

11

why are you changing your plea to guilty rather than retain-

12

ing a not guilty posture?

13

THE DEFENDANT:

14

MR. IWASAKI:

Why are you pleading guilty today?

I am not sure.

Did we not discuss what the State was

15

going to do at the penalty phase is to not ask for the death

16

penalty, per se, by at least putting in facts before the court

17

as to what they believed the facts to be?

18

THE DEFENDANT:

19

MR. IWASAKI:

20

THE DEFENDANT:

21

MR. IWASAKI:

Yes.

Did we not discuss that?
Yes, we did.

And is the Information that —

Is that one

22

of the reasons why you are changing the plea, because the

23

county attorney's office has stated that they would not demand

24

that you be executed?

25

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

1 ||

MR, IWASAKI:

2 H

THE DEFENDANT:

3 11

THE COURT:

4 ||
5 ||
6 II

But rather, submit it to the court?
Yes,

That is true.

All right.

M r . Phillips, did y o u
MR. METOS:

—

May I also add, Your Honor,

—

You are a l s o aware, Robert, of the state of the

7

evidence and we have discussed the chances of your being found

8

guilty of a lesser offense and being found guilty of the

9

offense that is charged?

10

THE DEFENDANT: Y a h .

11

THE COURT:

We have gone through that.

All right.

After having gone through that

12 with your counsel, Mr. Phillips, do you have an opinion about
13

the evidence against you?

Do you think that you are likely to

14 be convicted of the greater offense?
15

THE DEFENDANT:

16

THE COURT:

Y e s , ma'am.

All right.

Y e s , ma'am, I do.

And we will be spending consid-

17 erable time, I think, reviewing that evidence, although, as I
18 understand it, the defendant's plea is entered.
19

And Mr. Phillips, I need you to indicate to me if

20

you are entering your plea of guilty because y o u are in fact

21

guilty of the offenses that are charged in t h e Information.

22 11

THE DEFENDANT:

23

THE COURT:

Y e s , ma'am, I am.

All right.

Specifically, the Information

24

alleges that on or about January 1st, 1980, here in Salt Lake

25

County, y o u caused the death of Everett Hamby, Jr. while you
8

1

were engaged in the commission of an aggravated robbery?

2

THE DEFENDANT:

3

THE COURT:

-4
5
6
7
8
9
10

Are those facts true and correct?

THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:

Yes, ma'am,

Yes, ma'am.

All right.

And did you cause his death

knowingly and intentionally at that time?
THE DEFENDANT:

Not intentionally.

It was accidental.

But I was still at fault.
THE COURT: Jill

right.

With respect to the intentional partf I will need

11

a proffer from counsel respecting the facts that exist to

12

establish intent.

13

MR. IWASAKI:

Your Honor, the facts would indicate that

14

Mr. Hamby was shot once in the back of the head, a bullet

15

going from right to left in an area about a centimeter above

16

the top of his ear, exiting approximately —

17

ear, exiting approximately the middle of the temporal bone on

18

his left ear.

19

atop of his right

Further, the evidence will show, and Mr. Phillips

20

has subsequently confessed to the —

21

shot were placed into the body by Mr. Phillips.

22

that a second and third

Based upon Mr. Phillips1 inability to explain the

23

reasons why the second and third shot were fired, it is our

24

opinion, Mr. Metos and myself, that, with a hurdle to pass,

25

the facts would indicate an intentional nature, although in

1

M r . P h i l l i p s f _CT^jminLtLJ:here I s $QT&€> . q u e s t i o n ^as^Jig

2

not the first shot w a s i n t e n t i o n a l .

3

s h o t s , the u n e x p l a i n a b i l i t y of t h o s e o t h e r two s h o t s , w o u l d

4

indicate from c i r c u m s t a n t i a l e v i d e n c e h i s i n t e n t i o n a l n a t u r e

5

of them.
THE COURT:

6

A l l right-

Mr. Iwasaki has said about what the e v i d e n c e would show?

9

THE DEFENDANT:

10

THE C O U R T :

11
12

H o w e v e r , the other two

M r . P h i l l i p s , d o y o u d i s a g r e e in a n y w a y w i t h w h a t

7
8

ythetheror

No.

No, ma1am.

All r i g h t .

In Count II of the I n f o r m a t i o n y o u a r e charged on
the s a m e d a y w i t h h a v i n g u n l a w f u l l y and i n t e n t i o n a l l y

taken

13 II p e r s o n a l p r o p e r t y from the p o s s e s s i o n or the control of
H

Everett Hamby, J r . against his w i l l by the u s e of force or

15

fear.

D o y o u admit to those facts as w e l l ?

16

THE DEFENDANT:

17

THE C O U R T :

Yes, mafam, I do.

All r i g h t .

And do y o u admit to the intent

18

w i t h respect to those facts?

19

intended to take the p r o p e r t y from h i s p o s s e s s i o n w i t h the u s e

20

of force or fear or a firearm?

21

THE D E F E N D A N T :

22

THE COURT:

Do y o u a c k n o w l e d g e that y o u

Yes, ma'am.

All right.

H a v e y o u had a c h a n c e , M r .

23

P h i l l i p s , to d i s c u s s as fully and c o m p l e t e l y as y o u d e s i r e ,

24

y o u r d e c i s i o n to plead g u i l t y w i t h y o u r a t t o r n e y s , M r . M e t o s

25

and M r . Iwasaki?

10

1

THE DEFENDANT:

2

THE COURT:

3
4
5
6

Yes, ma'am, I do.

Are you satisfied with the advice and the

counsel that they have given to you?
.THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:

Yes, ma'am.

Do you have any questions for the court now

that you would like to discuss?

7

THE DEFENDANT:

8

THE COURT: All right.

9

No, ma'am.
I am specifically concerned that

you understand that all the State has agreed to do in return

10

for your guilty plea, and, frankly, it is not very much, they

11

have not reduced the charges, they have not agreed even to

12

stipulate to a lower penalty.

13

not strenuously argue in favor of the imposition of the death

14

penalty.

15

All right.

All they have agreed to do is

Do you understand that their agreement

16

not to argue strenuously in favor of the death penalty is in

17

no way binding upon this court, and in fact could be entirely

18

ignored by this court at the time of the sentencing phase of

19

this proceeding, and that the court could, based on the evi-

20

dence before it, and in fact might impose the capital penalty

21

that is provided by law; that is, the death penalty?

22

THE DEFENDANT:

Yes, ma'am.

23

THE COURT: All right.

I understand that.

So you understand very clearly

24

that all you are getting in return for this plea is the

25

silence of the State?
11

1 ||

THE DEFENDANT:

2 ||

THE COURT:

Yes, ma'am,

And that is only at the argument phase,

3 II They are still going to put on evidence, as I understand it,
4 || that would justify and substantiate the imposition of a death
5 || penalty.
6 11

THE DEFENDANT:

7

THE COURT:

Yes, ma'am.

"All right.

Is there anything about your

8

condition here today, Mr. Phillips, that might impair your

9

ability to think carefully about this decision?

Are you in a

10 I good frame of mind?
11

THE DEFENDANT:

12

THE COURT:

13

THE DEFENDANT:

u

THE COURT:

15
16
17

Yes, ma'am.

Do you understand what's going on?
Yes.

Are you taking any drugs or medication for

any purpose?
THE DEFENDANT:

I am taking medication to help me sleep

at night.

18

THE COURT:

What is that?

19

THE DEFENDANT:

I couldn't tell you the name of it.

20

have been trying to get the name of the medication from the

21

doctor.

22

THE COURT:

All right.

23

THE DEFENDANT:

24

THE COURT:

25

during the day at all?

Since I have been incarcerated.

Does it affect your ability to function

12

I

1

THE DEFENDANT:

2

THE COURT:

3

No, ma'am.

All right.

And do you believe you are in

full control of yourself and your faculties here today?

4

THE DEFENDANT:

5

THE COURT:

Yes, ma'am, I do.

All right.

I would like you now to sign

6

that affidavit that is before you on the podium that Mr.

7

Iwasaki has prepared and that we have discussed here, and I

8

want you to sign it as an indication, number one, that you

9

have read it; number two, that you understand its contents;

10

number three, that everything that is in its contents is true

11

and accurate and correct as far as you know; and number four,

12

and most important, that your decision to enter this plea of

13

guilty is freely and voluntarily made, that nobody's threat-

14

ened you or promised you anything except what we have talked

15

about, the State not arguing strenuously, and that you desire

16

to plead guilty yourself.

17

THE DEFENDANT:

18

THE COURT:

19

THE DEFENDANT:

20

THE COURT:

21

in open court, please.

Yes, ma'am.

Are all of those things true?
Yes, ma'am, they are.

All right.

22

MR. IWASAKI:

23

(Defendant complies.)

24

MR, IWASAKI:

25

Would you sign the affidavit now

Sign your full name.

As previously stated, Your Honor, Mr.

Metos and myself and Mr. Christensen have signed this already.
13

1

THE COURT:

All right.

May I see it?

2

(Affidavit submitted to the court.)

3

THE COURT:

Although I don't ordinarily require the

4

formality of having the witness sworn in connection with the

5

affidavit, I think in this case I would prefer to do that.

6

MR. IWASAKI:

7

THE COURT:

I would agree, Your Honor.
Would you raise your right hand, please, Mr.

8

Phillips.

9

record with respect to the truthfulness of your statements as

10
11

And what I want you to do iw take an oath on the

contained in this affidavit.
THE CLERK:

Do you solemnly swear the testimony you are

12

about to give in the matter now before the court will be the

13

truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help

14

you, God?

15

THE DEFENDANT:

16

THE COURT:

17

I do.

All right.

Thank you.

Mr. Phillips, you are now formally and officially

18 [I under oath, and I would like you to reaffirm your answer to
19 || the questions which I have just asked you; namely, does your
20

signature on this affidavit represent the fact that, number

21

one, you have read it?

22

THE DEFENDANT:

23

THE COURT:

24

THE DEFENDANT:

25 11

THE COURT:

Yes, ma 1 am.

Number two, that you understand it?
Yes, roafam.

Number three, that its contents are true and

14

1

correct?

2

THE DEFENDANT:

3

THE COURT: And number four, that your decision to plead

4

guilty is made of yo\ir own free will and choice?

5

THE DEFENDANT:

6

THE COURT:

7

Yes, ma'am.

Yes, ma1am.

All right.

Thank you very much.

Having heard the defendant's affirmation of his

8

now sworn statements in the affidavit, and having reviewed the

9

affidavit, based upon its contents and his reponses to my

10

questions here in open court, I find that his plea of guilty

11

to two charges, one of criminal homicide, murder in the first

12

degree, and one of aggravated robbery, a first degree felony,

13

is freely and voluntarily made.

14

accepted and entered in the record of the court.

15

I will order that it be

Having done that, we need to move on to the sen-

16

tencing phase of the hearing.

17

sentence you in no less than two nor more than ten days from

18

today's date.

19

And the statute requires me to

I don't know whether the statute actually provides

20

for a capital homicide hearing under these circumstances.

21

Ordinarily that phase would begin immediately after the

22

verdict and the entry of the verdict.

23

MR. METOS:

Well, as I read the capital sentencing phase

24

statute, I think it is 76-302, says that upon conviction a

25

hearing shall be held.

It doesn't specify a time period.
15

ADDENDUM D
Plea Affidavit (1980)

GLENN K. IWASAKI
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G. FRED METOS
Salt Lake Legal Defender Assoc.
Attorneys for Defendant
333 South 200 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: 532-5444
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT, IN
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,

AFFIDAVIT OF DEFENDANT

Plaintiff,
-vROBERT ALAN PHILLIPS,

Case No. CR 80-296

Defendant,
I, ROBERT ALAN PHILLIPS, the above named defendant,
under oath, hereby acknowledge that I have entered a plea of
guilty to the charges of CRIMINAL HOMICIDE, MURDER,

FIRST

DEGREE and AGGRAVATED ROBBERY contained in the Information on
file against me in the above-entitled court, a copy of which
I have received. That I understand the charges to which this
plea of guilty is entered are a capital crime and a felony of
the first degree, and that I am entering such a plea voluntarily
and of my own free will after conferring with my attorneys, GLENN
K. IWASAKI

and G. FRED METOS and with the knowledge and under-

standing of the following facts:
1. I know that I have a constitutional right under
the Constitution of Utah and the United States
to plead not guilty and to have a jury trial
upon the charges to which I have entered a
plea of guilty, or to a trial by the court should
I elect to waive a trial by jury. I know I have
a right to be represented by counsel and that I
am in fact represented by GLENN K. IWASAKI and
G. FRED METOS as my attorneys.
2.

I know that if I wish

to "have a trial in court

upon the charges, I have a right to be confronted by the witnesses against me by having them
testify in open court in my presence and before

^

the court and jury with the right to have
those witnesses cross examined by my attorney.
I also know that I have a right to have witnesses subpoenaed by the State at its expense
to testify in court upon my behalf and that I
could, if I elected to do so, testify in court
on my own behalf, and that if I choose not
to do so, the jury can and will be told that this
may not be held against me if I choose to have
the jury so instructed.
3.

I know that if I were to have a trial that the
State must prove each and every element of the
crimes charged to the satisfaction of the court or
jury beyond a reasonable doubt; that I would
have no obligation to offer any evidence myself;
and that any verdict rendered by a jury whether
it be that of guilty of not guilty must be by
a unanimous agreement of all jurors.

4.

I know that under the Constitutions of Utah and
of the United States that I have a right against
self-incrimination or a right not to give evidence against myself and that this means that I
cannot be compelled to admit that I have committed any crime and cannot be compelled to
testify in court upon trial unless I choose to
do so.

5.

I know that under the Constitution of Utah that
if I were tried and convicted by a jury or by the
court that I would have a right to appeal my
conviction and sentence to the Supreme Court of
Utah for review of the trial proceedings and that
if I could not afford to pay the costs for such
appeal, that those costs would be paid by the
State without cost to me and to have the assistance

-2-
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of counsel on such appeal.

However, it is my

further understanding that while I am waiving
my rights to appeal as to guilt, I still preserve my right to appeal as to the constitution

ramifications of the Utah death

penalty statutes.
6.

I know and understand that by entering a plea of
guilty I am waiving my constitutional rights
as set out in the five preceding paragraphs
and that I am, in fact, fully incriminating
myself by admitting I am guilty of the crimes
to which my plea of guilty is entered.

7.

I know that under the laws of Utah the possible
maximum sentence that can and may be imposed
upon my plea of guilty to the charges identified
on page one of this affidavit are:
(A)

Death or life imprisonment.

(B)

Imprisonment in the Utah State Prison
for a term of not less than five
years and not more than life.

(C)

And/or fined in any amount not in the
excess of $10,000.

And that the imprisonment may be for consecutive
periods, or the fine for additional amounts, if
my plea is to more than one charge.

I also know

that if I am on probation, parole, or awaiting
sentencing upon another offense of which I have
been convicted or to which I have pleaded guilty,
my plea in the present action may result in consecutiye sentences being imposed on me.
8.

I know that the fact that I have entered a plea
of guilty does not mean that the court will not
impose either a fine or sentence of imprisonment
upon me and no promises have been made to me by
anyone as to what the sentence will be if I plead

guilty or that it will be made lighter because
of my guilty plea.
9,

No one has forced or threatened or coerced me to
make me plead guilty and I am doing so of my
own freewill and after discussing it my attorneys.
I know that any opinions they may have expressed
to me as to what they believe the court may
do are not binding on the court.

10.

No promises of any kind have been made to induce
me to plead guilty.

1 am also aware that any

charge or sentencing concessions or recommendations
or probation or suspended sentences, including a
reduction of the charges for sentencing made or
sought by either defense counsel or counsel for
the State, is not binding on the court and may
be approved and followed by the court.
11.

I am not now under the influence of either drugs
or alcohol.

12.

I have read this affidavit, or I have had it read
to me by my attorneys, and I know and understand
its contents.

I am 26 years of age, have attended

school through the 12th grade and 1 can read
and understand the english language.

I have

discussed its contents with my attorneys and ask
the court to accept my plea of guilty to the charges
set forth above in this affidavit because 1 did,
in fact, on the 1st day of January, 1980, in
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, intentionally
or knowingly cause the death of Everett Hamby, Jr.
while [ was engaged in the commission of, or an
attempt to commit, or flight after committing or
attempting to commit Aggravated Robbery; and
that on or about the 1st day of January, 1980,
in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, unlawfully
and intentionally take personal property in the

possession of Everett Hamby, Jr, at or near 2700
West 900 South, from the person or immediate
presence of Everett Hamby, Jr., against his will,
by the use of force of fear, and in the commission
of same did use a firearm.
DATED this

I6>^

day of ^ll/xj£>

, 1980.

%*&az.
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me in Court this

day of

CU/I/
A'

1980.

r^JL

M. DU
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

AY/W?}

CERTIFICATE OF DEFENSE ATTORNEY:
We certify that we are the attorneys for ROBERT ALAN PHILLIPS,
the defendant named above and we know he has read the affidavit,
or that we have read it to him, and we discussed it with him
and believe he fully understands the meaning of its contents
and is mentally and physically competent.

To the best of

our knowledge and belief the statements, represertations and
declarations made by the defendant in the for§gpj*j affidavj
are in allrespects accurate and true.
SNN K. IWASAKI
Defense Attorney

G. FRED M E T O S (
Defense Attorney
CERTIFICATE OF PROSECUTING ATTORNEY:
I certify that I am the attorney for the State of Utah in its

case against ROBERT ALAN PHILLIPS, defendant.

I have reviewed

the Affidavit of the Defendant and find that the declarations
are true and accurate.

No improper inducements, threats, or

coercions to encourage a plea have been offered the defendant.
The plea negotiations are fully contained in this affidavit
or as supplemented on the record of the court.

There is

reasonable cause to believe the evidence would support the
conviction of the defendant for the plea offered or for the
greater offense as charged, and that acceptance of the plea
TOiid serve the public interest.

BASED UPON THE FACTS set forth in the foregoing Affidavit and
Certification, the Court findsthe defendant's plea of guilty
is freely and voluntarily made and it is ordered that
defendant's plea of "guilty" to the charges set forth in the
Affidavit be accepted and entered.
DONE IN COURT THIS /£>i%

day of

(././*//

, 1980.

0
Of • '''^7 * '
CHRISTINE
M. DURHAM
(,4
xM/tf/7/,
/Qr</r//tm
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
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